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When most people, in the U.S. at least, think of “the Microsoft case,” they think
of the antitrust case filed in May 1998 by the United States government along with 20
states and the District of Columbia.  In April 2000 a trial court found that Microsoft had
violated U.S. antitrust law by illegally tying its Internet Explorer browser to its Windows
operating system, attempting to monopolize the Web browser market, and taking a
variety of anticompetitive actions aimed at Netscape’s Navigator browser and Sun
Microsystems’ Java programming language in order to maintain an operating systems
monopoly.2  The government had also charged that Microsoft had prevented Netscape
from distributing its browser, but the trial court found that it had not done so.
In June 2001 an appeals court agreed that Microsoft was guilty of illegal actions
aimed at maintaining a monopoly in operating systems, but it shortened the list of illegal
actions substantially.  Moreover, it held that the trial court had employed the wrong
standards to decide the tying claim and dismissed the claim that Microsoft had attempted
to monopolize the browser market. (Though the plaintiffs were given the opportunity to
re-litigate the tying claim, they declined to do so.)  This case has recently become two
cases in an important sense: a trial court judge in Washington D.C. is now both
evaluating a remedy agreed to by Microsoft, the U.S. government, and nine states and
holding hearings on a much stronger remedy proposed by nine other states and the
                                                                
1 Delivered as the European Investment Bank lecture at the European University Institute, March 26, 2002.
The author is indebted to Jorge Padilla and Bernard Reddy for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to
Kirstyn Walton for diligent assistance, but I alone am responsible for errors and opinions.
2 The author was the expert witness for Microsoft in this trial.
3District of Columbia.3  Whatever she decides will almost certainly produce another round
of appeals.
Microsoft’s Antitrust War
But this case (or pair of cases) is just one battle, albeit the main one so far, in an
ongoing war of antitrust litigation involving Microsoft.4  The U.S. government began its
antitrust investigation of Microsoft in 1990.  Its main concern then was that IBM and
Microsoft would monopolize the desktop operating system business by crippling
Windows and developing OS/2 together.  This investigation continued long after its
initial concern had evaporated.  It culminated in a consent decree (a settlement agreed to
by the parties and endorsed by a federal judge) in August 1995 that barred Microsoft
from using certain licensing practices for Windows.  The decree also contained a
provision barring Microsoft from tying other products to Windows, though this provision
explicitly exempted “integrated products.”  In July 1996, a private firm sued Microsoft
for treble damages, based on many of the allegations considered but not pursued by the
government during its initial investigation. 5   In January 2000 this private case was settled
for an estimated $150 million in damages.6
In late 1997 the federal government charged that Microsoft’s inclusion of a
browser in Windows 95 constituted a tie in violation of the 1995 consent decree.  The
court of appeals declined to uphold the government’s charge in June 1998.
The federal government began a second investigation of Microsoft in 1996, which
served as the basis for the major case (or cases) now staggering to a conclusion in
Washington.  After the trial court found Microsoft to have violated the law in this
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4proceeding, more than 130 private cases were filed. These involve allegations considered
by the U.S. government from 1990 onward along with new charges, and they seek
billions of dollars in treble damages.  A negotiated settlement for almost all these cases
was rejected by a federal judge in January 2002 as not being in the public interest, and all
these cases are proceeding to trial.
After the court of appeals found Microsoft guilty of monopolization, AOL Time
Warner, which had purchased Netscape in 1999, filed suit against Microsoft in January
2002.  The court was asked to order Microsoft to pay several billions of dollars of
damages and to impose an injunction against Microsoft to “eliminate the continuing
effects of Microsoft’s illegal conduct and to restore competition lost in the operating
system market and in the Web browser market because of Microsoft’s illegal conduct.”7
AOL Time Warner indicated that it intended to pursue the tying claim that the federal
government and the states had declined to re-litigate.  In February 2002, Be Incorporated
also filed suit against Microsoft.  Be had provided an operating system for Intel-
compatible computers until selling all its assets to Palm the preceding November.  During
the earlier trial, Be’s CEO had contended that its operating system did not compete with
Windows, but its February complaint contended the Microsoft had excluded the Be
operating system from the market that Windows dominated.  Most recently, in March
2002, Sun Microsystems also filed a private suit against Microsoft.  Sun is asking for $1
billion in damages and, among other things, for Microsoft to be required to bundle Sun’s
Java system with Windows.
Even though this long war is still far from over and its ultimate outcome is still in
doubt in some respects, I believe a number of its important lessons have become clear.
While some items on the list I put forward here may be controversial, the first is surely
not:
Lesson 1: The cost of being firmly ensnared in the web of U.S.
antitrust can be enormous.
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5The Microsoft war is the leading recent example of what Judge Richard Posner
has called the “cluster bomb effect” in antitrust litigation: a single action or investigation
may spawn a large number of government and private suits in a variety of jurisdictions
with a variety of legal standards.8  A cluster of lawsuits in the U.S. is almost inevitable
when a profitable firm is found to have violated the antitrust laws.  The ability to sue for
three times actual damages on behalf of a class of injured parties provides livelihoods for
a large number of able and aggressive trial lawyers and an asset to the shareholders of
arguably injured firms.  In announcing its lawsuit in March 2002, for instance, Sun
Microsystems contended, plausibly, that it had a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to sue.
Commenting on the filing of the AOL Time Warner lawsuit, a noted antitrust scholar
observed that “Microsoft could easily be litigating these kinds of tag-along claims for 10
years or more.”9
While the many millions of dollars that Microsoft has thus far paid in lawyers’
fees and damage awards amount to a small fraction of the firm’s market value,
Microsoft’s antitrust war is far from over.  When all the dust has settled in all the
courtrooms where battles are still being fought, Microsoft’s ultimate out-of-pocket costs
may be a large multiple of its costs to date.  Moreover, the firm’s ultimate total costs may
be a large multiple of its out-of-pocket costs.
Microsoft’s behavior has been under investigation by the federal government
almost continuously since the days when MS-DOS was its most important product and
the World Wide Web had not been invented.  Its top executives have had to devote a
significant fraction of their time to dealing with antitrust matters.  Not only have they had
to formulate and revise strategies for negotiation and litigation, they have had to testify
(and prepare for testimony) repeatedly and to deal with endless inquiries from the press,
public, customers, collaborators, employees, and prospective employees.  Employees at
all levels in the firm have had to store documents they would normally have discarded
and to produce millions of pages of documents in response to numerous requests from
numerous parties.  The firm’s once lofty reputation and the reputations of its top
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6executives have been badly tarnished, imposing intangible but not inconsequential costs
on both.
Microsoft’s costs will escalate dramatically when, inevitably, its conduct is
governed by court orders.  The settlement that Microsoft negotiated with the federal
government and nine states restricts the firm’s contracting practices, requires disclosure
of some of its intellectual property, and imposes constraints on the design of its products.
The final order proposed by the non-settling states imposes much stronger restrictions
and constraints and requires much more disclosure.  Microsoft would be required to
produce a large number of different versions of Windows and to use an arbitrary formula
to determine the price of each.  Under either of these proposed orders, or any plausible
blend, customers and competitors would be able to allege violations of the order to a
court.  Because product boundaries and technology change rapidly in this industry, the
interpretation of any court order will inevitably involve the exercise of considerable
judgment – thus inviting customers and competitors to use the process of enforcing the
ultimate court order or orders to advantage themselves at Microsoft’s expense.  Microsoft
will not be out of the U.S. antitrust web until the court orders that result from the current
war expire – likely many years from now. 10
I turn next to some key lessons from this war for antitrust policy and then to
implications for business management.  My overall conclusion, to which I return at the
end, is that U.S. antitrust policy toward competition by leading firms in dynamic
industries, as revealed by the Microsoft case, creates strong incentives for such firms to
pull their competitive punches and gives their competitors strong incentives to engage in
socially unproductive rent-seeking. 11  Unfortunately, there is no simple fix for this.
While some productive reforms seem apparent, the policy problems posed by dominant
firms in industries with histories of dynamic competition are complex and not susceptible
to exact solution by litigation or regulation.  Such firms should not be immune to
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7antitrust.  The wisest course for enforcement policy would seem to require unusually high
levels of humility and restraint.
Lessons for Antitrust Policy
A key element of the government’s case against Microsoft was the contention that
its Windows product gave it monopoly power in “the market for operating systems for
Intel-compatible personal computers.”  If “monopoly power” is defined conventionally,
as the ability to hold price substantially above competitive levels and to stave off the
threat of entry by an equally efficient competitor, there can no doubt that Windows had
monopoly power.
Indeed, one can argue that this sort of monopoly power is almost inevitable in
many software businesses and other dynamic industries — industries in which innovation
and new product development are key instruments of competition.  Almost all the costs
of producing software are fixed, so scale economies are substantial.  Both network
effects, in which the value of something to any one user rises with its usage by others,
and system effects, in which the value of one component of a system depends on the
quality and price of complementary components, are important factors in the success of
Windows.  In particular, Windows serves as an important software “platform,” providing
services, such as the ability to display files on-screen, that permit applications programs
to run efficiently and to be controlled by users.  Much of Windows’ current value and
much of the difficulty facing any sort of “me-too” entrant stem from the number of
popular applications it currently supports.  An operating system that by itself would be
just as good as Windows would not be nearly as attractive unless it would also support a
comparable suite of useful applications.  These arguments and the history of this industry
suggest that Windows, like word processors and spreadsheets, competes in what might be
called a “winner-take-most” business: at any one time there is likely to be a single
dominant product, with others existing mainly in specialized niches.
The conventional approach to measuring market power begins by defining a set of
reasonably close substitutes as the relevant market and computing sellers’ shares of that
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8market.  A high market share is taken to signal monopoly power, particularly when
accompanied by high accounting profits and barriers to equally efficient entry.  Using this
conventional approach, one would conclude that the software industry, which strikes
many observers as intensely competitive and in which category leaders have often been
reduced almost overnight to the status of fringe products, is in fact full of monopolists or,
in EU terminology, dominant firms.  On both sides of the Atlantic, such firms are subject
to special scrutiny because they are held to be unusually capable of using their market
power (because they have an unusual amount of it) to protect themselves from fair
competition.  And, indeed, antitrust enforcement in the Clinton administration took
exactly this point of view toward dynamic industries generally, not just as regards
Microsoft.12
One important problem with this approach is that leadership positions in software
businesses and in other dynamic industries are often fragile.  Leaders in such industries
may not be threatened by “me-too” products competing on price, but, as in Joseph
Schumpeter’s poetic vision of a half-century ago,13 they risk being obliterated by the
superior products that regularly emerge from intense dynamic competition to develop
radical innovations.  This risk constrains firms’ ability to take anticompetitive actions: it
is clearly what motivates market leaders in dynamic industries to invest heavily in
improving their products and, at least in the case of Microsoft, to price well below what a
static analysis suggests the traffic would bear.14
While as a logical matter a full analysis of competition must take into account the
possibility of Schumpeterian creative destruction – the result of competition to be the
next temporary monopolist, that is, of competition for the market rather than in the
market -- the analysis of dynamic competition is very difficult and inevitably depends
heavily on market-specific knowledge and on the exercise of judgment.  It is difficult and
thus uncommon for industry leaders to produce radical, disruptive innovations, so that
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9current market shares are of little use in the analysis of Schumpeterian competition. 15
Moreover, those plotting to depose leaders rarely brag about it, so investments in
dynamic competition are difficult to measure.  Finally, a history of dynamic competition
is neither necessary nor sufficient for such competition to pose a significant threat to
today’s market leaders.  Many industries go through a period of intense dynamic
competition until the emergence of a dominant design and then go through long periods
without disruptive innovations: the auto industry is a good example.16  Thus, knowledge
of the market and of the technology is necessary to make an intelligent forecast of the
likelihood of disruptive innovation – and such forecasts are often wrong.
The easiest way for courts to deal with this difficult issue is to ignore it.  After all,
any discussion of the possibility of a current market leader being displaced by radical
innovation is somewhat speculative – even if it is speculation that keeps sensible CEOs
awake at night.  This is what was done in the Microsoft case: even as the firm was
frantically trying to deal with the emergence of Web-based services as a threat to desktop
computing, this serious threat was found by the trial court to be speculative.  The
direction of bias is apparent, even if its importance is not.
Lesson 2: The traditional static analysis of market power understates
the importance of competition in dynamic industries.
To be clear, static and dynamic competition are not perfect substitutes.  It should
be illegal for market leaders, however fragile their position, to engage in price-fixing or
to foreclose competitors from distribution.  As I noted at the outset, Microsoft was in fact
charged with foreclosing Netscape’s distribution, though the trial court found that it had
not done so.  The fragility of its market leadership was essentially irrelevant to the
analysis of that charge and at least some others charges.  But to focus only on static
price/output competition in the market is to exclude most of the important competitive
activity in dynamic industries and thus to start antitrust analysis with a misleading picture
of market conduct and performance.
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In the Microsoft trial, the government’s experts argued at length that it was
predatory for Microsoft to have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to develop the
Internet Explorer browser and then to give it away as a part of Windows.  The trial judge
characterized Microsoft’s conduct as “predatory,”17 though he did not explicitly list
predatory conduct as a violation.  The government did not pursue a claim of predation on
appeal, and the appeals court explicitly found that it was not illegal for Microsoft to have
developed Internet Explorer at great expense and given it away. 18  Still, the analysis of
this issue during the trial revealed another important lesson:
Lesson 3: In “winner-take-most” industries, traditional definitions of
predation make no economic sense, thus neither do traditional tests.
The trial judge, quoting an earlier case, concluded that, “Because Microsoft’s
business practices ‘would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation
that … the entry of potential rivals’ into the market for Intel-compatible PC operating
systems will be ‘blocked or delayed,’ … Microsoft’s campaign must be termed
predatory.”   The use of profit maximization as a standard, rather than profitability,
departs from most U.S. precedent, which requires both actual losses (not just profits less
than they could be) and a reasonable probability of recouping those losses after
competition has been excluded.  Moreover, profit maximization is a standard that is
inherently unknowable.  Finally, general adoption of this standard would severely restrict
competition, particularly in dynamic industries.  Businesses in such industries routinely
invest in creating intellectual property and building consumer loyalty.  If these
investments did not provide market power, in part by discouraging entrants, they would
not be worth making.  To bar them all would plainly lower consumer welfare.
The issue here goes beyond what standard or test to employ to detect predation in
practice, however.  Even defining predation is more difficult, indeed probably
impossible, in winner-take-most industries.  Suppose an incumbent monopolist, M, and
an entrant, E, are engaged in a race to develop and market the next-generation graphics
package.  Suppose also that it is clear that when the dust settles one package will become
the standard, while the other will be used by, at most, a few customers with specialized
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needs.  As a matter of definition, what level of R&D and marketing spending by M
should be termed predatory?
The only definition in the literature, by Ordover and Willig, holds that “the
relevant question is whether the innovator anticipated positive incremental profit for the
new product, given the continued viability of the rival.”19  But what can this mean in a
winner-take-most industry?  If E remains viable, M will not be profitable, and vice versa.
Thus there is no policy for M that will generate “positive incremental profit, given the
continued viability of E.”  Whether M has the purest of intentions or a black predatory
heart, the only way it can survive is by eliminating E – and the same goes for E.  Under
the Ordover/Willig test, whoever survives is guilty of predation, and both M and E will
rationally attempt to prey until one of them is driven to the wall.  This simply cannot be
sound policy.  The problem is not with the Ordover-Willig definition; it is that there is no
possible non-exclusion outcome that can be used as a baseline. Thus, even though I am
somewhat uncomfortable with the notion that being in winner-take-most competition
should be a full defense against charges of predatory behavior, I see no logical
alternative.
Back in 1997 and 1998, the Microsoft case seemed not to be about predation but
all about the allegation that Microsoft had illegally tied its Internet Explorer browser to
its Windows operating system.  And, though this claim is no longer being pursued by any
government, analysis of the tying claim in this case teaches the following:
Lesson 4: In dynamic industries, antitrust restrictions on “tying”
inhibit competition in product design.
In U.S. law, the standard requirements for a tying violation are as follows:20 (1) two
separate product markets exist, based on distinct demands;  (2) the defendant has market
power in the tying product market; and (3) consumers are forced to buy a product or
service they might not otherwise purchase.  No inquiry into impacts on consumers is
required.  (I gather that EU law is broadly similar.)  In the Microsoft case, the
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government argued that there were separate markets for browsers and operating systems
(even though all operating systems included browsers by the time of trial); that Microsoft
had market power in operating systems; and that consumers had to take Internet Explorer
when they bought Windows (even though the marginal cost of including it was zero, and
Windows users were able to employ other browsers).  The trial court agreed and found
Microsoft to have engaged in illegal tying.
The appeals court, in a strange discussion, argued that the standard tying law
should not apply to “platform software markets,” enunciated a set of standards it felt
should apply, and invited plaintiffs to try and meet those standards in a new trial.
Plaintiffs declined.  The idea that there should be one law for “platform software
markets” and one law for everything else makes little sense, and one can hope it will not
long endure.
In fact, dynamic competition often involves creating new products by combining
features and services that were formerly only available separately.  The addition of
features and functionality has been a major force in the PC software industry since its
inception.  In the early 1980s, for instance, word processing software included neither
spell-checkers nor grammar checkers.  There were stand-alone products in both
categories.  By the late 1980s, the leading word processing programs included spell-
checkers; by the early 1990s they also included grammar checkers.  When WordPerfect,
then the leader in this category added a spell-checker, it made life difficult for
competitors in both categories.  Under the standard law, this was surely an illegal tie.  It
is not difficult to come up with many more examples in other dynamic industries.
I don’t think the way to deal with the ubiquity of product integration in dynamic
industries is to try to formulate different standards for different product categories, as the
Microsoft appeals court did.  Neither economists nor courts can pretend to know enough
to ensure that consumer welfare would be well served.  I believe a better approach,
consistent with that being developed by some U.S. courts, is to have tougher standards to
prove illegal tying by product design than when tying is done by contract.  Specifically, I
believe it generally makes sense to condemn tying by product design, as here, only if the
tying aspect of the design lacks technical merit and leads to incompatibility with rival
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complementary products.21  In this case, the fact that Windows users could easily use
browsers other than Internet Explorer should have sufficed to dispose of the tying claim.
Most U.S. economists who study antitrust policy favor substantially weakening or
even abolishing standard tying law on the grounds that it does not reliably promote
consumer welfare.  Why then did the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, which employs many able economists and takes consumer welfare as its
objective, use tying law to attack Microsoft’s design of Windows?  It may be some time
before we have a full answer, but I believe part of the answer is clear now.  In the Clinton
Administration, the Antitrust Division had great confidence in its ability to improve
market performance,22 and I believe it became convinced that Microsoft’s behavior was
broadly and deeply anti-competitive.  It thus seized on tying law as a weapon it could use
to get a court to find against Microsoft, which would in turn give it license to restrain the
firm’s behavior in ways that it felt would enhance competition.
If this is true, it causes one to ask how did the Antitrust Division become
convinced that Microsoft needed to be restrained?  Again, we don’t yet have a complete
answer, but it is clear that Microsoft’s competitors played an important role.  When
leading firms take competitive actions that threaten the viability of smaller rivals, the
latter often attempt to enlist the antitrust enforcers in their struggle.  In the U.S. at least,
enforcement agencies are generally aware that most attempts of this sort are simply rent-
seeking and aim to reduce the intensity of legitimate competition. 23  But complaining
firms in dynamic industries with novel, esoteric technologies can sometimes defeat this
skepticism by making claims that the agencies simply lack the expertise to evaluate.
Enforcement agencies generally want to enforce and, if logic and evidence can’t tell them
who is right, emotion may decide in favor of the smaller firm, particularly if it has a
better public image or better political connections and appears to be in distress.  In this
case, Microsoft and its CEO had a reputation for being arrogant and aggressive, while
Netscape seemed to be a group of pleasant young kids who gave out cute little Godzilla-
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like dolls.  Because U.S. courts, at least, have an even harder time dealing with novel
technical issues than government agencies, the risk of judicial hostility to leading firms
can be substantial.  Thus we have
Lesson 5: Because antitrust authorities and courts lack technical
expertise in dynamic industries, they can sometimes be enlisted in
socially harmful rent-seeking.
In the Microsoft case, the leading example of this phenomenon involves the
allegation of tying. 24  From version 3.0 onwards, Internet Explorer has been designed as a
part of Windows, not an application like Word or Excel – or Netscape’s Navigator
browser.  The first way in which this is true is that much of the software code used to
perform browsing functions is also used by the operating system to perform other
functions; this provides obvious efficiencies.  For instance, the code used to display
HTML files downloaded from the World Wide Web during browsing is also used to
display Help files and other HTML files stored on the hard disk.  If this code is deleted,
the operating system simply will not work.  The second way in which Internet Explorer is
part of Windows is that the code used to perform browsing functions at the user’s request
is also available for use by applications programs through what are called application
programming interfaces or APIs.  Thus, for instance, other programs can use Windows to
display HTML files from the Web, and some non-Microsoft browsers (and many other
programs) in fact do this.  If code that supports a set of APIs is deleted from Windows,
applications that rely on those APIs will not run, and supporting applications programs is
a core operating system function.
Despite these facts, much of the discussion of the tying claim in the trial involved
“deletion” of Internet Explorer.  The government seemed not to believe Microsoft’s
description of the design of Windows, though perhaps it was merely behaving
strategically.  When their software expert testified, having had access to the underlying
Windows source code, he repeatedly used the term “deletion” to describe blocking end-
user access to Internet Explorer.  Toward the end of the trial, it seemed to the Microsoft
camp that both sides had implicitly agreed that the only remotely feasible way to create a
15
version of Windows “without Internet Explorer” would be to block end-user access to the
browsing functions in Windows.  Nonetheless, it turns out that the trial record is anything
but clear on this point, and both the trial court and the court of appeals found Microsoft to
have violated the law by “placing code specific to Web browsing in the same files as
code that provided operating system functions” so as to prevent PC makers from deleting
Web browsing (i.e., Internet Explorer) code.25  To Microsoft, this is an experience
straight out of Kafka: this distinction simply does not correspond to any real difference.
The set of code that is “specific to Web browsing” is essentially empty.  Nonetheless
Microsoft’s request that the appeals court reconsider this technically absurd finding was
quickly rebuffed, and this finding is currently playing an important role in the remedy
hearing in Washington.
Lessons for Business Management
The brief discussion above of the costs to Microsoft – actual and potential,
tangible and intangible – of the antitrust war in which it has been engaged for the last
dozen years should serve to make clear the value of avoiding such a war.  Wars between
nations are often deterred by displays of strength and aggressiveness, but there are no
workable deterrence strategies here.  Rather, in addition to good legal advice, a firm is
more likely to avoid an antitrust war by seeming weak and gentle.  Comparing
Microsoft’s behavior with the behavior of high-tech market leaders like Cisco, AOL
Time Warner, Netscape, Sun, and Intel that have for the most part avoided serious
antitrust battles suggests the following multi-part lesson:
Lesson 6: To avoid the web of U.S. antitrust, leading firms in dynamic
industries should court allies, use email with care, woo enforcers, and
consider competing softly with small or politically connected firms.
Firms like Microsoft that depend for their health on the development of high
quality, innovative complementary products by third parties, necessarily need to develop
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allies.26  In particular, in developing and marketing Windows, Microsoft needs to work
closely with both PC makers and independent software vendors.  Depending on how they
have been treated in the past or expect to be treated in the future, however, some allies
stick with you even under heavy fire, while others depart as soon as hostilities begin.
There is a difference between allies of conviction and allies of convenience, and
Microsoft seemed to lack the former.  It seemed that as its antitrust war became serious,
many of Microsoft’s apparent allies, or at least many of their mid-level employees, were
willing to complain and testify against it, and it seemed to have few defenders.
The old U.S. Steel case provides a stark contrast.  In its 1920 decision in this case,
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly noted that a large number of competitors had testified
that U.S. Steel’s conduct had not restrained them in any way. 27  Of course, U.S. Steel was
meeting with its competitors to discuss keeping prices high, while Microsoft has charged
relatively low prices and moved aggressively to improve and broaden its product line.  In
so doing it has competed with firms that had formerly produced complements to its
products.  This sort of behavior may benefit consumers, but it does not yield allies of
conviction.
The point about email should be obvious to anyone who has followed the
Microsoft case in the press: much of the most apparently damning evidence against
Microsoft came from its own emails.  Most large corporations have learned from this
case and have tried to teach their employees to avoid using email for sensitive subjects
and to compose email messages as if they were to be read to a hostile court.  But the
nature of the medium is such that these instructions are hard to follow.
The danger from emails is greatest in dynamic industries, in which emails are
often loaded with jargon and inside jokes that may not be charitably decoded by a judge
or jury.  Moreover, the young, hyper-competitive employees who typically play key roles
in such industries are often inclined to posturing and overstatement.  For example, early
in the case the government made much of an email that said, in effect, it is absolutely
vital to Microsoft that Internet Explorer be included in the next release of the operating
                                                                
26 For interesting discussions of the issues this has raised for Microsoft and other firms, see Annabelle
Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano, Platform Leadership, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002.
27 U.S. v. United States Steel Corporation et al., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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system for the Apple MacIntosh, and if the recipient can’t get it done, Bill Gates will do
whatever it takes to make it happen.  This was initially interpreted by the government as
indicating that Gates would pressure Apple as hard as necessary to force it to include
Internet Explorer.  This interpretation was finally ruled out only when it was observed
that the email had been sent after Apple and Microsoft had signed a contract obligating
Microsoft to supply Internet Explorer for inclusion by Apple.  The email simply indicated
that if necessary, Gates would provide additional development resources to ensure that
this obligation was met.
All large firms find themselves talking from time to time with antitrust agencies –
directly or through outside counsel.  The tone of those conversations may have serious
long-run impacts.  Most large U.S. firms have Washington offices and attempt to make as
many influential friends as possible.  Until fairly recently, though, Microsoft and many
other technology-based firms did not see the point of making friends in Washington or
other capitals, and they dealt with antitrust authorities with a certain impatience.  After
all, they were in an intensely competitive sector where regardless of history, you’re only
as good as your latest release, where, as Intel’s Andy Grove famously put it, “Only the
Paranoid Survive.”  Why should they need to woo antitrust authorities and other
government officials?  The Microsoft antitrust war has provided a definitive answer to
that question.
The last point in the Lesson above is crucial from a management perspective –
and very disturbing from the viewpoint of public policy.  When a market leader pulls its
competitive punches, competitors sleep better and complain less, but consumers are
harmed.  In dynamically competitive industries, market leaders seem to be particularly
vulnerable to attack by competitors who either sue (in the U.S.) or persuade an antitrust
or competition policy agency to do so.  Thus in those industries, management should
think about competing softly with those who can directly or indirectly do it harm in court.
Sometimes, of course, a firm can’t afford to pull its punches in this fashion.  In 1995,
Netscape had by far the most popular Web browser and was using that position to shape
Internet standards to its advantage.  Marc Andreesen, one of Netscape’s founders and
senior officers, repeatedly announced that Netscape would transform its browser into a
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platform competitor of Windows by supporting a rich set of APIs.28  Microsoft had little
choice but to react and compete hard.  Netscape’s lawyers went to Washington and the
rest, for better or worse, is history.
Conclusion
 Microsoft Corporation is either an antitrust enforcer’s dream or a nightmare,
depending on how much he or she worries about consumer welfare.  It is a dream because
it is large, powerful, and aggressive, with an unpleasant public image and fewer loyal
friends in the corporate world than one might expect.  Its executives say what seem to be
the most appalling things to each other via email.  Attractive competitors with complaints
about Microsoft abound, and one can expect courts to be skeptical of any attempt by
Microsoft to introduce technical arguments in its defense.  Microsoft operates in markets
that are far from the polar ideal of perfect competition, and it regularly makes large
investments (in R&D, among other things) intended to enhance its market power and
make its products into essential standards.  Applying the strict standards that antitrust has
developed to judge the conduct of monopolists or dominant firms, it is likely that
Microsoft (along with other leading high-technology firms) can be found in violation for
competing too hard.
But Microsoft is also a nightmare because its establishment of Windows as a low-
cost standard not tied to a single computer maker has been the source of enormous
progress.  It is hard to argue that Microsoft’s responses to actual and potential
competition have harmed consumers, and there is no obvious rule or formula that can be
used to improve the long-run performance of the markets in which it operates.  Short-run
performance can, of course, be improved by putting intellectual property into the public
domain, perhaps even creating multiple competing versions of Windows, or forcing price
reductions.  And competitors can be made happier by restricting Microsoft’s ability to
add features and functionality to its products and to compete in other ways.  But
consumers are directly harmed if Microsoft competes less, and in the long run actions
                                                                
28 Michael A. Cusumano and David B. Yoffie, Competing on Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and the
Battle with Microsoft , New York: Free Press, 1998, p. 105.
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that undermine network effects by artificially fragmenting standards or that reduce
incentives to innovate may multiply the damage.
Lesson 7: Antitrust is too blunt and dangerous an instrument to use to
fine-tune the performance of dynamic industries.
Antitrust enforcers in the Clinton administration would not have accepted this
lesson.  They viewed dynamic industries, like software, as meriting special antitrust
attention, both because these industries are shot through with (short-run) market power
and because they had confidence in their ability to engineer improved performance.  They
viewed dynamic competition as typically a one-shot affair, with the winners’ market
positions strongly protected by durable first-mover advantages, so that rapid intervention
was sometimes necessary to prevent anticompetitive acts from having very long-lived
effects.
The Microsoft case should serve to erode confidence in the ability of antitrust
enforcement to improve performance in dynamic industries.  The appeals court decision
handed down in June 2001, and which will shape relief that can take effect no sooner
than mid-2002, stems from a complaint filed in 1998 that dealt in large part with the
design of Windows 95 in the 1994-95 period.  The time from 1995 to 2002 is an eternity
in the software industry.  During this period, dynamic competition has been an ongoing
process, and leadership positions in various categories have been threatened by, among
other things, the rise in Web-based services.  In this case and in others, there is a real
danger that the market will have changed so much by the time the case has concluded as
to make it impossible to use the original record to design a useful remedy.  Judge Richard
Posner, after having served as a mediator in this case in early 2000, argued that antitrust
is simply too slow to deal effectively with high-technology industries.29  Add to this the
fact that the probability of prosecutorial and judicial error is enhanced when emerging
technologies are being considered, particularly if enforcement agencies feel compelled to
intervene rapidly, and the risks of an aggressive antitrust policy become quite serious
indeed.
                                                                
29 Posner, supra  note 8.
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To be clear, I am not arguing that a history of dynamic competition should confer
immunity from antitrust.  Again, static and dynamic competition are not perfect
substitutes.  No matter how innovative a firm has been, it should not be allowed to take
actions that are clearly anticompetitive.  If Microsoft had actually used its short-run
monopoly power to prevent its competitors from distributing their products, for instance,
significant relief would have been in order.  But it is surely far less obvious that
consumers were harmed when Microsoft added high-quality browsing capability to
Windows – in part in response to Netscape’s announced intention to transform its market-
leading browser into a software platform that would compete with Windows.  The
problem is not vigorous enforcement in clear cases, but hasty enforcement that aims to
fine-tune performance in difficult cases – and particularly when complaints originate with
competitors who have an obvious interest in hobbling the market leader.  A recognition
of the limitations of administrative and judicial processes and the attendant problems of
delay and error make clear the great value of humility and restraint – virtues that, sadly,
have recently been in short supply in the antitrust enforcement agencies with which I am
familiar.
